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Transnational Media Law at the Bar and in
the Classroom
Jack M. Weiss*
Good morning, it is a pleasure to be here. As a media lawyer, I
must say that it is a particular thrill to be on a panel and not to be talking
about Valerie Plame and Judy Miller. It is also a pleasure to see many of
my old friends here. Kevin Claremont pointed out to me that our
outlines are back to back in the materials that have been distributed this
morning. It is the first time our outlines have been back to back since we
were in the same study group in law school some thirty-five years ago.
At the other end of the spectrum, I see Hari Osofsky. The last time I
spoke to Hari, she was a senior in college and thinking about going to
law school. She called to ask me what I thought about that enterprise,
and, of course, the rest is history.
I've represented news organizations in the practice of law for nearly
thirty years. I spent most of my career practicing in Louisiana. I moved
to New York about eight years ago when Bob Sack, with whom I co-
teach a seminar on media law at Columbia Law School as an adjunct,
was named to the Second Circuit. I took Judge Sack's place as the
primary outside counsel for Dow Jones & Company and The Wall Street
Journal, and that was really the reason I moved to New York. Frankly,
until I moved to New York, and during my many years of teaching in
Louisiana as an adjunct, it never occurred to me to incorporate
international materials into my courses. This wasn't simply a matter of
parochialism. Eight or ten years ago, there was no compelling need or
practical force that drove the incorporation of international materials into
the teaching of media law.
That has all changed now, however. I think it is fair to say that the
linchpin of that movement has been the near-universal distribution of the
content of American publishers on the internet and the resulting
explosion of the involvement of those publishers in litigation abroad,
particularly in the United Kingdom and former Commonwealth
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countries. Today, virtually every American publisher posts its content on
the internet. By doing so, the publisher may well subject itself to the
laws of other countries where the content can be accessed on the web.
Just to give you an idea of the metrics of this, to the best of my
recollection, Dow Jones has been sued for libel three times in the United
States during my seven and one-half year tenure in New York. In the
same period of time, the company has been sued at least five times
abroad, and three of those cases have gone to trial. So, content litigation
outside of the United States is very obviously a matter of practical
importance. As an adjunct teacher of media law, it seemed to me that if
we were to give our students any kind of foundation for what they might
expect in this area of practice, we needed to expose them to the
international dimension of the problem.
In particular, our focus is the libel law of the United Kingdom and
Commonwealth countries and related problems. As you know, London
is often described as "the libel capital of the world." One commentator
has referred to what he calls "the vast libel industry" in London. For
those you who may not know it, there are actually one or two sections of
the High Court in London that are specifically devoted to the trial of libel
cases. So, if you are in London and so inclined, you can drop in on one
of these sections and actually observe an English libel trial most any day.
English law has relevance to our students for two reasons in
particular. First, the U.K.'s substantive law of libel is far less protective
of speech than U.S. law, which is limited by the First Amendment
principles of Sullivan' and Gertz2 and succeeding cases. It is the
defendant's burden in the United Kingdom to prove truth, not the
plaintiffs burden to prove falsity. Libel is a no fault tort, and there is no
privilege resembling our Sullivan privilege for erroneous statements
about public figures or public officials.3 The second reason why I think
it is important for our students to be acquainted with these principles of
law is that the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries
apply very aggressive principles of personal jurisdiction in accepting and
retaining jurisdiction over these cases. In the Gutnick case against Dow
Jones,4 the High Court of Australia specifically rejected the argument
that jurisdiction over internet publication should be limited to the state
where the content is created, uploaded, or first published. The court said,
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. But see the decision of the House of Lords in
Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe, [2006] UKHL 44 (reinterpreting "responsible
journalism" defense and holding that the defense should not be sustained only after the
"closest and most rigorous scrutiny", but applied in a "practical and flexible manner").
4. Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575.
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in terms hostile to the U.S. media, that to accept that principle would be
to relegate non-U.S. "victims of libel" to an extension of "U.S.
hegemony" over publishing law. For the most part, United Kingdom and
Commonwealth courts only require minimal publication in the foreign
state and allow virtually anyone, even non-residents, to sue for libel
against non-U.S. publishers. For example, Russian tycoon Boris
Berezovsky successfully sued Forbes magazine in London although, of
course, he didn't live in London.5 He simply asserted that he had a
reputation to protect in England. And more recently, Don King, the
boxing promoter and American public figure, has been permitted to
proceed with a libel action in London against a New York-based
American lawyer who commented on King to two American boxing
magazines that then posted the content on the Internet.6 We have an
American public figure suing another American in the courts of the
United Kingdom. As a practical matter, then, media law professors
would leave students poorly equipped without exposure to international
principles and particularly the jurisdictional reach of U.K. courts.
This is, by the way, not simply a matter for the top media outlets in
the United States. For example, the Lexington, Kentucky newspaper,
which happens to be owned by Knight Ridder, was sued in Cyprus by a
Cypriot-American doctor who was the subject of a local investigative
piece published in the Lexington newspaper.
Other than simply its practical importance, it is also important to
teach this material in a media law course because it is interesting and
rapidly evolving. I think it is fair to say that U.S. libel law since the
decade between Sullivan in 1964 and Gertz in 1974 has been largely
stable and interstitial. There was concern at one point that the Supreme
Court might prune back the extent of the First Amendment protection for
libel. In fact, in my view, pretty much the opposite has proven to be true.
In Milkovich,7 the court reaffirmed the basic principles of Sullivan and
Gertz. In contrast, the English law of libel is rapidly evolving and in a
state of great flux with the adoption of the Human Rights Act in the
United Kingdom. 8 The Act incorporated the European Convention on
Human Rights into libel litigation and other legal disputes involving
speech in the United Kingdom. The courts of the United Kingdom, even
as we speak, are struggling with the meaning of that new important
principle. So, by looking at English cases, we give our students an
opportunity to look at libel law in flux. Students have a chance to see
5. Berezovsky v. Michaels, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004 (H.L.).
6. King v. Lewis [2004] EWHC 168 (Q.B.).
7. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
8. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
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judges making choices on the cutting edge of a body of law which has
been well established in the United States for quite a long time. 9
I want to touch briefly on some areas that we incorporate into our
course in order to present the kinds of issues and concerns that they
provoke. In the course of making this list, I became aware that in
teaching media law I have another objective, as you all do, when
teaching specialized courses. We not only want to convey the important
principles of a particular body of substantive law, but we want to expose
our students to universal or general principles that carry on to other areas
of law. Example number one: I have to admit that when I was exposed
to New York Times v. Sullivan, in my first year torts course, I really did
not understand its importance. I did not really understand the common
law framework against which the case was set. I did not understand, if
you will, the run up to Sullivan. What better way to expose our students
to that common law framework than to have them read a couple of
classic English libel law cases. One of the cases we use is Hulton v.
Jones.'0 It is a case essentially of mistaken identity. A publisher
publishes an accurate statement about X not realizing that there is
another X with the same name as to whom the statement is defamatory.
Under English law, it makes absolutely no difference whether that
publication was entirely fault-free; it is still actionable. So, we use
Hulton as an illustration of the no fault principle in English libel law.
We also use it as a springboard to ask what it means for publishers to live
under a regime in which fault is not a dimension of the tort of libel.
Now I have always liked to teach Sullivan because I find interesting
the interplay between state and federal law that is at the heart of the case.
I also love the prose of the case. But Sullivan is also a classic case for
exploring how judges make choices in deciding constitutional cases.
What better way again to get at that in a current setting than to expose
the students to the current evolution in the United Kingdom of the
Reynolds "responsible journalism" defense. 1 The House of Lords
dramatically reinterpreted Reynolds in a case involving Dow Jones in
2006. The new decision, Jameel, may well revolutionize English libel
law as much as Sullivan revolutionized American libel law more than
forty years ago.
Again, perhaps you find it useful in your first year torts course, if
you study defamation, to address the single publication rule. If we
covered the single publication rule in first year torts, I confess that I
9. The recent Jameel decision (see supra note 3) is emblematic of the rapid
evolution of modem English libel law.
10. Hulton v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20 (H.L.).
11. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, 2 A.C. 127 (H.L. 1999).
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probably did not understand it very well. A wonderful way to address
the single publication rule is through exposure to the famous, or perhaps
infamous, 1849 Duke of Brunswick case.' 2 In that case, the Duke sent his
manservant to pick up a copy of an article from the newspaper office.
He sent his servant on this errand some eighteen years after initial
publication of the article. The English court held that delivery of the
article to the servant, even so many years later, constituted a new,
actionable publication. This highly technical "publication" was held to
be actionable notwithstanding that the six-year statute of limitations had
long since run; English law treats each publication as a separate and
independent act giving rise to a new cause of action. Duke of Brunswick
is now somewhat in doubt as the result of another evolving line of
English case law, but, again, it is a wonderful way to illustrate the
differences between our conception of libel law and that of our friends in
the United Kingdom.
We also devote a block of material in our course to the jurisdictional
issues that relate to international libel law. We compare the aggressive
reach of U.K. and Commonwealth forums over these cases to recent U.S.
Court of Appeals cases taking a far more restrictive approach to internet
jurisdiction as between the states of this country. These cases include
Young v. New Haven Advocate13 in the Fourth Circuit and Revell v.
Lidov14 in the Fifth Circuit. This material provides a very nice contrast
to what most Commonwealth jurisdictions are doing by way of internet
jurisdiction and also provides a very useful opportunity to read and
discuss closely Calder v. Jones,15 the leading Supreme Court case on
domestic interstate jurisdiction over libel cases.
We also read and discuss the case law reflecting the refusal of U.S.
courts to enforce U.K. libel judgments because enforcement of such
judgments would conflict with U.S. public policy. The two leading cases
are Telnikoff v. Matusevich16 and Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications
Inc.'7 Those cases have been questioned in the reporters' notes to the
recent American Law Institute project on international jurisdiction and
judgments. We have the students read the reporters' notes and discuss
them. You can see that we are dealing with a variety of issues not simply
with substantive libel law.
Finally, if time permits, we discuss the efforts of U.S. publishers to
12. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, (1849) 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (Q.B.).
13. Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
14. Revell v. Lidov, 371 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
15. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
16. Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
17. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992).
2006]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
preemptively fend off foreign libel actions. This includes the lawsuit
filed by my own client, Dow Jones, against Harrods, the English
department store, in the Southern District of New York. Along these
lines, there is another very interesting Southern District case in which a
U.S. book author, Rachel Ehrenfeld, sued a Saudi defendant, Khalid bin
Mahfouz. Ms. Ehrenfeld sought to secure a declaratory judgment that a
default libel judgment entered against her in the United Kingdom would
not be enforceable in the United States, even though the U.K. plaintiff
has made no effort to attempt to enforce the judgment here.18 In this line
of cases, we encounter additional issues like justiciability and
international comity. It is useful for our students to be exposed to these
issues although they do not involve substantive media law as such.
I should also note for purposes of completeness that the
international law incorporated into our course is not limited to libel law.
For instance, the European community actually now arguably recognizes
a reporter's privilege to a greater extent than the United States, at least as
a matter of federal constitutional or common law.
Now, just a few practical suggestions. In using in English or
Commonwealth materials, we have found that the decisions and so called
"speeches" of the judges are often quite long and discursive. The
decision of the High Court of Australia in Gutnick, for example, is an
important case, but, in its entirety, it is lengthy read for students.
Therefore, we edit these cases or use excerpts from these cases as
necessary.
Whenever logistics permit, we have found it very helpful to invite a
U.K. libel solicitor or barrister to one of our classes. We also have found
generally that there is a distinction between putting these non-U.S.
decisions on the table for discussion as background materials and
actually analyzing them closely or taking them apart the way we might
U.S. domestic precedent. We do not feel entirely comfortable in doing
that. We do not teach the cases the same way we might teach a U.S. case.
Of course, paper topics are a wonderful opportunity for the students to
explore these precedents in more detail if they choose to do so.
Finally, if you're considering using any of these materials in one of
your courses, in my view, the best text on U.K. media law is Robertson
& Nicol, Media Law, published by Penguin Books in London and now in
its fourth edition. This book can be ordered from Amazon's U.K.
website. Each year, the Media Law Resource Center ("MLRC") in New
York publishes an annual fifty-state survey of American libel law. As
18. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 2006 WL 1096816 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006)
(dismissing the action on the ground that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.)
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part of this survey, MLRC includes an annual overview of the U.K. libel
law written by very knowledgeable U.K. solicitors who specialize in
media law.
As your practitioner guinea pig, it has been a pleasure speaking with
you. I hope that my suggestions have been helpful. Thank you.

